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THE CASE AGAINST STRICT LIABILITY
ALAN SCHWARTZ *
Professor Schwartz identifies the foundational assumptions of strict products lia-
bility law, and argues that these assumptions are either false. not supportive of
banishing free contract, or not proven on the current evidence. After showing
that, on the evidence now available, strict liability cannot be shown to be more
efficient than free contract, Professor Schwartz argues that the choice among
legal regimes should be made by a "representative consumer"--a person who
knows what is knowable about markets and who knows that he lives in a liberal
state, but who does not know what position he will occupy in that state. Professor
Schwartz concludes by demonstrating that such a consumer would choose a free-
contract regime complemented by required disclosure.
INTRODUCTION
0 NLY plaintiffs' lawyers like today's products liability law. Its rules,
however, rest on assumptions about the behavior of consumers and
markets that the legal community generally accepts. The law will not
change substantially as long as these assumptions are retained. This Ar-
ticle shows that the foundational assumptions are either false or not sus-
tainable on the evidence. Such a showing is a necessary prelude to
serious reform.
It will be helpful to specify the reach of the claim made here. In the-
ory, society could resolve the product-defect problem by regulation; in
fact, resource limitations prevent the state from regulating more than a
small subset of products and product warnings. The question thus is
what the "legal default" should be: in the absence of regulation, should
the state delegate primary responsibility for product safety to courts or to
the market? Courts now reject the market in favor of the law of strict
products liability. To understand just how, realize that strict liability law
has two facets. The first facet holds that firms cannot contract out of
liability for product defects. Respecting this facet, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code allocates to firms the risk that products will be defective or
will fail to conform to the seller's representations,' but permits firms to
contract out.2 The first facet of strict liability holds that firms cannot
contract out of liability for product defects. The second facet of strict
liability regulates product quality. A firm is liable for both manufactur-
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The John M. Olin Lecture Series, Fordham Law School (1991). I am grateful for the
many hospitalities the Law School faculty extended. Edward Yorio was characteristi-
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ing defects and design defects. A product has a manufacturing defect
when it is less well-made than the firm intended (for example, adulter-
ated food). A firm is liable for a manufacturing defect regardless of the
degree of care the firm took. A product has a design defect when its
design generates risks in excess of benefits. This liability standard closely
resembles a negligence test.
Strict liability implies a rejection of the market for two related reasons.
First, the market allocates risks by contract. The first facet of strict lia-
bility bans contracting about the defective product risk in favor of impos-
ing that risk on firms. Second, and consequently, courts and juries must
decide just when a product is defective. The second facet of strict liabil-
ity thus regulates product quality.
This Article argues that the courts' choice of the judicial system rather
than the market as the legal default was a mistake. Thus, the analysis
focuses primarily on the first aspect of strict liability, which prevents pri-
vate parties from allocating the defect risk by contract. If this aspect
falls, then the regulatory aspect of strict liability becomes less important;
contracts commonly will define the quality standard that products must
meet. This article first shows that all but one of the assumptions that
support the first aspect of strict liability either are false or not supportive
of banishing contract, and that the truth of the remaining assumption,
that consumers misestimate accident risks, has not been established.
This Article then argues that the choice between the courts or the mar-
ket should be made by a "representative consumer"-a person who
knows what is knowable about markets and who knows that he lives in a
liberal state but who does not know what position he will occupy in it,
and who respects the values of freedom and equality. Such a person
would prefer the market as the legal default for assigning risk because
free contracting would increase his (and every other consumer's) ex-
pected payoff from product purchases more than strict liability would,
given uncertainty about how possible consumer-risk misperceptions af-
fect market performance. The values of freedom and equality have broad
appeal in our society. Thus, while reasoning from them is not a purely
deductive enterprise, they are the appropriate basis from which to at-
tempt to infer answers to basic law-reform questions. The method of
deriving the legal regime that governs product-related accidents from ap-
propriately specified values of the representative consumer is similar to
the method of deriving basic legal structures from the basic values that
citizens in a liberal state do and should find attractive.3
3. See generally Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 Phil. &
Pub. Aft. 223 (1985) (in a constitutional democracy, the public conception of justice
should be political and not based on controversial religious and moral doctrines); Rawls,
The Ideal of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 Oxford J. of Legal Stud. 1 (1987) ("What is
needed is a regulative political conception ofjustice ... that has the 'support of an over-
lapping consensus' of society."). Useful critiques of the methodology these articles advo-
cate are Hampton, The Moral Commitments of Liberalism, (unpublished manuscript)
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Part I of this Article identifies the basic assumptions of strict liability
and shows how they support modem doctrine. Part II shows that
(i) most of the key assumptions should be rejected; (ii) the evidence is
insufficient to establish whether a particularly important assumption-
that consumers misperceive accident risks-is true; and (iii) if consumers
do misperceive accident risks, whether unregulated markets would pro-
duce too little or too much safety (as measured by consumer preferences)
is unknowable a priori. Part III argues, using the method just described,
that strict liability should be repealed on this record in favor of a regime
of free contracting supplemented by required disclosure. Part IV con-
cludes by briefly arguing that the Federal Government should play an
important role in such a legal regime. There is a question whether an
argument against strict products liability comes too late in the day;
courts are unlikely to abandon the doctrine any time soon. This question
reflects a misunderstanding of the scholarly enterprise. Legal institutions
seldom survive in free societies when people reject their basic rationales.
Recent legislative interventions in the tort field that confine or limit the
effect of strict liability suggest that its rationale has become
controversial.4
I. THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
A. The Assumptions
Modem products liability law rests on six basic assumptions, some of
which relate to consumer preferences and others to sources of market
failure. The basic assumptions are:
A,: Shifting accident costs from consumers to firms increases
utility. This assumption actually has two aspects:
A,.1: Utility is increased if a concentrated loss is removed
from one person and spread broadly over a universe of persons.
This function is performed by insurance.
A1.2: Consumers prefer to insure with product manufacturers
rather than with market insurers.
A2: Consumers either will not or cannot read sales contracts.
A3: Firms have monopoly power, and will use this power to
degrade the "quality" of consumer contracts. This assumption also
has two aspects:
A3.1: Some firms have structural monopoly power, and
monopolists are unresponsive to consumer preferences.
(1991) (copy on file in Fordham Law Review) and Neal, Justice as Fairness: Political or
Metaphysical?, 18 Pol. Theory 24 (1990).
4. The view that courts themselves may be having second thoughts is argued in Hen.
derson, Jr. & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical
Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 479 (1990). This article's goal is to help move




A 3 .2 : In markets with many firms, consumers will not search
for contracts that contain desirable risk allocations. Sellers
behave as monopolists toward consumers who do not search-
that is, who will not exit a firm that offers a bad deal to try
another firm.
A4: Consumers prefer manufacturers to reduce accident risks.
This assumption follows from two subassumptions:
A4.1: Consumers prefer more safety to less.
A4.2: Manufacturers have a comparative advantage at
producing safety.
A 5: Consumers misestimate the risks that products pose. This
assumption has three aspects:
A5.1: Firms do not supply information relevant to risk;
consumers cannot make correct decisions on insufficient
information.
A5.2: Consumers would ignore or misprocess information that
firms could be made to supply because consumers would suffer
from information overload or would make systematic cognitive
errors.
A5.3: Consumer misestimates cause consumers to purchase
too many unsafe products and too little insurance coverage
against product-related harms, and also induce firms to
underproduce safety.
A6: Firms use market power, when they have it, to degrade
product quality (in addition to contract quality).
B. General Legal Implications
Every justification of strict liability makes all or some of these assump-
tions. This subpart shows how the assumptions underlie the doctrine of
strict products liability. Assumption A1 holds that consumers prefer to
insure with manufacturers against product risks. Assumption A2 holds
that consumers either will not or cannot read sales contracts. If consum-
ers do not read, then firms will not sell insurance. To understand why,
suppose first that consumers believe that firms are supplying insurance.
Then the firms will price as if they were supplying insurance, but use
disclaimers; the firms, that is, will charge for a service but not provide it.
Only injured consumers will find out that they are uninsured, but by then
it will be too late. On the other hand, assume that consumers believe that
firms are not supplying insurance; then the firms will not supply it be-
cause consumers would refuse to pay. A firm could not offer insurance
and attempt to persuade consumers to pay more because consumers
would not read the contract and thus would not know insurance was the
reason for the higher price. Hence, A, and A2 imply that courts should
require firms to supply insurance-to be strictly liable for consumer
injuries.
Assumption A3 holds that firms that have structural market power, or
[Vol. 60
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market power in consequence of too little consumer search, will be unre-
sponsive to consumer preferences. In particular, such firms will not sup-
ply consumers with contracts that consumers prefer. Assumption A,
holds that consumers prefer insurance. Because structural market power
and search-induced market power are pervasive, consumer contracts thus
will require firms to supply too little insurance. Hence, A, and A3 also
imply that courts should impose the risk of product-related harms on
firms. Under this view, strict liability is justifiable even if consumers read
sales contracts. In addition, assumption A4 holds that consumers prefer
safety and that firms have a comparative advantage at supplying it, and
A6 holds that firms with market power will degrade product quality.
Therefore, A4 and A6 also imply strict liability in the many situations in
which firms have market power.
Assumption A5 holds that consumers misestimate risks in such fashion
as to cause firms to undersupply insurance and safety. This assumption
is particularly powerful. To see why, suppose that assumptions A2, A3,
and A6 are false but that A5 is true. Then consumers will read the con-
tracts, search across firms for contracts, and get contracts they prefer.
These contracts, however, will be "wrong." They will require too little
insurance because consumers think products are safer than they actually
are. Also, consumer risk misestimates will induce firms to produce too
little safety. Strict liability is necessary to get the right contracts and the
right safety level, as measured by the preferences of well-informed con-
sumers. Thus A,, A4, and A5 also imply strict liability.
C. The Rules
As stated above, the legal superstructure that the strict products liabil-
ity assumptions support has two related facets. First, free contracting is
prohibited. Second, a firm will be held liable regardless of the care that it
used. This second aspect of strict liability applies only to manufacturing
defects-defects caused by products that fail to meet the manufacturer's
own quality standards.
Products liability law would be intellectually suspect, but largely invis-
ible to the public, if it just held firms liable for manufacturing defects and
barred contracting out.' Firms could partly control their exposure under
these rules by using product designs with low failure rates and by using
careful inspection techniques. Residual liabilities also are insurable be-
cause the defect probability is predictable. 6 The basic assumptions im-
5. In contrast, the Contract Law rules regulating liquidated damages clauses are
intellectually suspect, but not the subject of newspaper editorials.
6. This is an overstatement. Although firms know accident probabilities, they have
difficulty knowing accident costs because these vary widely across consumers. Neverthe-
less, insurance markets have supplied products liability coverage without difficulty when
the bulk of the cases concerned manufacturing defects. The application of the law be-
came uncertain when it sought to regulate more than manufacturing defects. Legal un-
certainty creates insurability problems. See Winter, The Liability Insurance Market, 5 J.
Econ. Persp. 115, 122-23 (1991).
1992]
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ply, though, that products liability law cannot be confined to
manufacturing defects. A product could meet its maker's standards but
those standards may be too low. For example, a car with a flawless steel
dashboard lacks a manufacturing defect, but there is a case for padding
the dashboard. Assumptions A2 - A5 imply that consumers and firms
cannot be permitted to agree on how safe a product design should be
because free contracting is unworkable. Courts must regulate design
safety when the market cannot.
Products designs are currently regulated under a negligence test: a
design is defective if, in the opinion of a jury, the design creates risks in
excess of benefits. The jury thus must behave as an ad hoc administrative
agency: it reviews the manufacturer's design tradeoff between cost,
amenities, and safety, and holds the manufacturer liable if jurors think
the tradeoff should have been made differently. Much concern with cur-
rent law arises because juries are thought to do less well in reviewing
product designs than administrative agencies are thought to do.
Another feature of current law deserves mention. An implicit premise
of early products liability law was that consumers cannot influence
safety. This premise is false in two respects. First, consumers prefer safe
products to dangerous products (see A4); when informed consumers
purchase on this preference, there.will be fewer accidents. Second, con-
sumers can use products in safe ways, if they know how. Current law
attempts to create incentives for consumers to reduce accidents. When a
product lacks a manufacturing defect but nevertheless is dangerous-a
well-made but risky drug, for example -the maker is required to warn of
the danger. An adequate warning is exculpatory, so consumers have an
incentive to read it. Also, if a product can be used in either a safe or a
less safe way, the maker is required to give instructions as to safe use.
The failure to follow appropriate instructions can result in a finding that
the consumer assumed the risk or was contributorily negligent. In either
case, the consumer cannot recover.
Warning doctrine also creates institutional difficulties. The law evalu-
ates warnings with a negligence test that has two facets. First, a firm is
required to warn of dangers of which it was, or should have been, aware.
Second, warnings and instructions must be adequate to influence the be-
havior of a reasonable person. Juries assess maker-awareness and warn-
ing-adequacy. The latter inquiry requires expertise (as Part IV shows),
and agencies do use experts in the few areas where warning form and
content are regulated. The former inquiry seems more appropriately
made by juries, but even here expertise is helpful. Juries have been more
willing than regulatory agencies to find that firms should have given
stronger warnings against asbestos, yet agency findings have probably
been closer to the truth.7 Assumption A5 nevertheless implies that firms
7. See Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic
Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. Legal Stud. 689, 695-703 (1985). The
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should warn and instruct, and that juries should review the firms' warn-
ing choices. Thus, again, the basic assumptions imply that jurors should
be ad hoc regulators.
II. WHICH ASSUMPTIONS HOLD?
A. Assumptions A, - A 4 and A 6
The first three assumptions are incorrect.' A, can be partitioned in
this way: consumers prefer to insure with product makers against (i) non-
pecuniary harms such as pain and suffering and (ii) pecuniary harms
such as lost earnings and medical expenses.
The first part of Assumption A, is incorrect because consumers prefer
not to insure against nonpecuniary harm. Consumers want to equalize
their marginal utility of income in all future states; hence, they will in-
sure against events that would increase this marginal utility and bet
against events that would reduce it. Consumers behave in this way be-
cause they want more income in states when their marginal utility for
money is high and less in states when their marginal utility for money is
low.
Injuries lower total utility but increase marginal utility insofar as the
consumer's loss is "replaceable:" victims must pay doctors, make up for
lost wages, and the like; a victim thus values each marginal dollar highly
because it satisfies urgent needs. When the consumer's loss is not re-
placeable, however, marginal utility is either reduced or not affected. A
wage loss is replaceable; the consumer uses an insurance payment to sub-
stitute for the lost wages. In contrast, a nonpecuniary loss, such as pain
and suffering, is not replaceable; dollars cannot erase pain. An insurance
payment thus would only permit the victim to purchase substitutes that
would "make up for" having incurred pain, or that would take the place
of activities that the victim could no longer engage in because of the acci-
dent. People apparently prefer not to buy insurance that would support
spending binges to compensate for having suffered, and commonly have a
lower marginal utility for replacement activities than they would have
had for those activities were they uninjured. Thus, consumers would re-
ject insurance against pain and suffering if given the opportunity to do
SO.
9
The second part of Assumption A, also is dubious: consumers do
difficulties of a common-law warning system are explored in greater detail in Part IV
below.
8. Readers should mentally add the phrase "on the evidence that now exists" to
such statements.
9. An extended version of this argument, which also summarizes prior contribu-
tions, is in Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97
Yale L. J. 353, 362-67 (1988). For recent data, see generally Viscusi & Evans, Utility
Functions that Depend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications, 80 Amer.




want insurance against events that would cause pecuniary harm (these
raise the marginal utility of income), but insurance from product sellers
seems a "poor buy" in contrast to market insurance. Product sellers can-
not use deductibles or precise risk classifications and have little expertise
evaluating claims; hence, a dollar spent buying insurance from a product
seller purchases less coverage than a dollar spent with an insurance com-
pany.1 ° A, is incorrect because when consumers want insurance, they
prefer market insurance.
Assumption A2, that consumers do not read sales contracts, is prob-
lematic. Product-defect risks are among the most important risks that
consumers face. Therefore, consumers probably are familiar with the as-
pects of contracts that relate to product failure. There is evidence consis-
tent with this view. Firms often compete on warranty coverage for high-
priced items. They would be unlikely to do this if consumer purchase
behavior were unaffected by the defect risk allocation-if, that is, con-
sumers do not know what the contract says. Also, the standard con-
sumer warranty is consistent with consumer knowledge of warranty
terms. This warranty imposes on firms those risks that firms could more
cheaply reduce, such as the risk of harm to, or a defect in, product mo-
tors, and imposes on consumers risks that consumers could more cheaply
reduce, such as the risk of harm to external trim. Such contracts maxi-
mize consumer utility by reducing purchase cost. Efficient contracts are
unlikely to be exacted by persons ignorant of contract content. I Finally,
strict liability is too massive a response to the problem of complex con-
tract language. The state can require firms to write simple language.
Many states have done this with "plain meaning laws." Strict liability,
therefore, cannot rest on the assumption that consumers do not know
what their contracts contain.
Assumptions A3 and A6 also seem incorrect. Firms with structural
market power can raise prices, degrade contract quality, or degrade
product quality. The typical response is to raise prices. Some analysts
show that when consumers have heterogeneous preferences for product
quality, firms may discriminate against consumers who prefer low qual-
ity, by choosing contract clauses that effectively eliminate these persons
from the market; that is, firms will offer higher quality products than
some consumers want.12 When firms have market power because of in-
10. See Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521,
1539-50 (1987); Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. Legal Stud.
645, 648-50 (1985).
11. Contracts between firms and consumers allocate the risks that products will not
work or will cause consequential damage similarly to the way contracts between firms
allocate these risks. Because firms are familiar with contracts, this similarity suggests
that manufacturers do not exploit consumers' inability or unwillingness to read. A more
extensive version of the argument in this paragraph appears in Chapter 7 of the ALl
Report: Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury (1991) and in A. Schwartz & R.
Scott, Commercial Law: Principles and Policies 204-07 (2d. ed. 1991).
12. Matthews & Moore, Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Explora-
tion in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening, 55 Econometrica 441 (1987).
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sufficient consumer search, firms seldom will offer consumers worse con-
tracts than the consumers prefer, and seem unlikely to degrade the
quality of important product attributes.1 3 The common profit-maximiz-
ing response of monopolists, according to many theorists, is to exploit
consumers only in the price dimension. No empirical evidence contra-
dicts this theory. Thus, the case for strict liability cannot rest on A3 and
A6, which state that firms exploit market power to degrade contract or
product quality.
Assumption A4 is partly correct. Consumers do prefer more safety to
less, other things (such as price) being equal. Manufacturers often, but
not always, have a comparative advantage at producing safety. If con-
sumers do misestimate risks, the case for strict liability thus can rest on
A4 and As. Does A5 hold?
14
B. Do Consumers Misestimate Risks?
1. A Framework
Assumption As, which states that consumers misestimate product
risks, is relevant to product safety in two ways. The first concerns safety
improvements: a consumer can underestimate, overestimate, or correctly
estimate the effect of a safety improvement. When consumers underesti-
mate the effect of a safety improvement, the firm cannot capture the im-
provement's full cost; consumers will resist paying when they
underestimate the marginal gain. Consequently, "pessimism" respecting
safety improvements creates insufficient incentives for firms to improve
safety. Conversely, "optimism" respecting safety improvements creates
excessive incentives.
The second effect of risk misestimates concerns the level of safety that
obtains at a given time: a consumer can underestimate, overestimate, or
correctly estimate the safety level. When consumers underestimate the
level of danger, they will buy too many unsafe products. Also, such opti-
mism respecting risk levels implies pessimism respecting safety improve-
ments. Consumers will pay more to reduce a risk when they perceive the
13. Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terns The
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Virginia L. Rev. 1387, 1453 (1983)
[hereinafter Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information]; Schwartz & Wilde, Product
Quality and Imperfect Information, 52 Rev. Econ. Stud. 251, 252 (1985). For an accessi-
ble model of the monopolist's choice see Schwartz, Unconscionability and Imperfect In-
formation: A Research Agenda, 1991 Canadian Bus. L.J. 437, 454-55.
14. Because consumers have a comparative advantage at reducing some accident
risks, strict liability should be combined with a contributory negligence defense. The
defense would create an incentive for consumers to use products safely. The law actually
combines strict liability with comparative negligence. This is sensible in the case of de-
sign defects but incoherent in the case of manufacturing defects. Respecting these, the
comparative negligence doctrine directs juries to compare degrees of fault, but the prod-
uct regulation aspect of strict liability holds the firm liable without an inquiry into fault;
hence, juries cannot know what to compare.
1992]
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risk level is high than they will pay when they perceive that it is low.' 5
Hence, when consumers underestimate the risk level, they also will un-
derpay for safety improvements. To the contrary, when consumers are
pessimists respecting risk levels-they think products are excessively
dangerous-not only will consumers purchase too many unsafe products,
they may also overpay for safety improvements. The case for strict liabil-
ity thus would be strongest were consumers to be optimists respecting
risk levels (because consumers would purchase too many unsafe prod-
ucts) and pessimists respecting safety improvements (because firms
would have insufficient incentives to improve those products).
There is more evidence about some aspects of A5 than others. Con-
sumers may misestimate risks when they lack information (A5.,). No
specific studies establish that consumers have or lack sufficient informa-
tion to make optimal decisions respecting product risks. Evidence exists,
however, that consumers search for information about the attributes of
expensive, dangerous, and infrequently purchased products, and that
markets respond by supplying this information. Consumers search when
buying these products because the size of a risk correlates roughly with
purchase cost (cars are more dangerous and more expensive than shoes);
the larger the risk, the greater the payoff to consumers from evaluating it
correctly.16 Experience probably is a good teacher respecting frequently
purchased items.17 Thus, any consumer-risk misestimates probably are
15. This result follows from the diminishing marginal utility of money theory, which
implies that consumers will pay more to reduce risks when their income is low than when
it is high. For further explanations, see Schwartz, supra note 9, at 408-09; Calfee &
Rubin, Some Implications of Damage Payments for Nonpecuniary Losses, J. Legal Studies
1992 (forthcoming) (file on copy in Fordham Law Review).
16. Relevant evidence through 1987 is summarized in Schwartz, supra note 9, at 378-
80, and in Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information, supra note 13, at 1432-34. A more
recent article states:
When consumers perceive risk in purchasing a product, marked changes oc-
cur in their behavior. They seek out information, become brand-loyal, stick to
well-known brands, and take other steps to minimize product failure.... Cer-
tain properties of products such as technological complexity, high price and
newness as well as consumer-related factors such as inexperience with the prod-
uct and importance attached to the purchase lead consumers to perceive risk.
Folkes, The Availability Heuristic and Perceived Risk, 15 J. Cons. Res. 13, 13 (1988).
Evidence that perceived risk increases search is in Srinivasan & Ratchford, An Empirical
Test of a Model of External Search for Automobiles, 18 J. Cons. Res. 233 (1991). Also,
"attribute redundancy" is common. For example, a consumer who knows that a car is
heavy also knows that the car probably is more crashworthy than lighter cars. Thus,
consumers may need to know less safety related information than is often supposed. At-
tribute redundancy is discussed in Johnson & Katrichis, The Existence and Perception of
Redundancy in Consumer Information Environments, 11 J. Cons. Policy 131 (1988). Fi-
nally, the result that consumers search more for expensive items implies that firms should
supply more information respecting product risks for these items. Recent evidence that
supports this prediction is in Laband, An Objective Measure of Search Versus Experience
Goods, 29 Econ. Inquiry 497, 505 (1991) ("Producer supply of quality assurance signals
[that is, advertising of warranties and guarantees] is significantly greater for durables than
nondurables.").
17. This claim probably is overstated as applied to frequently purchased products
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the result of cognitive error, not a lack of information on which to base a
decision."8
2. Analysis and Data
A more precise statement of the possibilities respecting the accuracy of
A5 is helpful. In the matrices below, the letter P indicates that a con-
sumer is pessimistic (for example, she thinks that products are more dan-
gerous than they actually are); the letter 0 indicates that the consumer is
optimistic (for example, she overestimates the effect of a safety improve-
ment); the letter C indicates that the consumer's perception is correct.
Consumer perceptions respecting safety improvements are in the rows
(and reported first); consumer perceptions respecting risk levels are in the
columns. Thus, the O,P cell asserts that consumers overestimate the ef-
fect of safety improvements but underestimate the current degree of






The weight of evidence shows that consumers do not underestimate
risk levels. Initially, consumers overestimate the risks of low probability
events (a product accident is a low probability event) when these risks are
salient.19 More generally, there is considerable evidence that consumers
overreact to negative information about products. This occurs because
negative information is more vivid-that is, more easily summoned to
mind.2' Studies also show that consumers correctly estimate some risk
that malfunction dangerously a very small percent of the time. Cans under pressure may
be an example.
18. Some researchers believe that markets now provide more information than con-
sumers can process. The results of laboratory experiments are mixed respecting whether
consumers "overload" when given considerable data. The author's view that "overload"
is mythic, together with supporting data, is in Grether, Schwartz & Wilde, The Irrele-
vance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. Cal. L Rev.
277, 294-99 (1986). A general review of research respecting consumers' cognitive behav-
ior, showing that recent work extends but does not substantially revise prior conclusions,
is Cohen & Chakravarti, Consumer Psychology, 41 Ann. Rev. Psych. 243 (1990).
19. The evidence is summarized in W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 135
(1991) and in the ALI Report, supra note 11, at 223-29. Consumers assign a zero
probability to risks of which they are unaware, but apparently do know that products can
cause harm.
20. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 380-81; see generally Folkes, supra note 16 (four
studies showing that consumers remember instances of product failure more than in-
stances of product success). Researchers have used the consumer's penchant for focusing
on vivid information to devise improved product warnings. See Moorman, The Effects of
Stimulus and Consumer Characteristics on the Utilization of Nutrition Information, 17 1.
Consumer Res. 362, 363-64 (1990) (warnings that stressed "negative consequences" pro-
duced better purchase decisions); Kelley, Gaidis & Reingen, The Use of Vivid Stimuli to
Enhance Comprehension of the Content of Product Warning Messages, 23 J. Consumer
1992]
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levels.21 All of this evidence suggests that consumers are pessimists re-
specting risk levels (if they are anything systematic). The apparent
penchant of consumers to put too much weight on evidence that is vivid
and too little weight on statistical data most strongly supports this con-
clusion. That a product has been associated with accidents is a more
vivid fact than the product's statistically good safety record. Because
both evidence and theory imply that consumers are not optimists respect-
ing risk levels, the first column of the matrix should be eliminated (all
cells that have 0 as the second letter).
The anchoring phenomenon suggests that consumers could underesti-
mate the effect of safety improvements. Consumers "anchor" when they
give too little weight to evidence that contradicts a theory or view that
they hold. Hence, if consumers think that a product is "just this danger-
ous," they may undervalue evidence that the improved version is materi-
ally safer. On the other hand, consumers may be pessimistic about risk
levels, which implies that consumers will overpay for safety improve-
ments. 2 It is difficult to know whether anchoring (and perhaps a general
skepticism about seller efforts to improve safety) is more significant than
the effect of pessimism respecting risk levels. To make the best case for
strict liability, assume that the anchoring effect is at least as important as
the overpayment effect.23 Then, the view that consumers are optimists
respecting the effect of product improvements must be rejected. The first
row therefore can be eliminated (all cells that have 0 as the first letter).






Aft. 243, 259 (1989) (warning symbols helped people better to remember warning
messages).
21. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 379.
22. Whether consumers over- or underestimate the effect of safety improvements, the
perception of important safety improvements increases the likelihood that consumers will
purchase. See McCarthy, Consumer Demand for Vehicle Safety: An Empirical Study, 28
Econ. Inquiry 530, 541 (1990) (that a car scores higher on crash worthiness strongly
determines purchase decisions). Also, consumers exhibit "ordinal competence" when us-
ing products; that is, drivers of light cars use seat belts more than drivers of heavy cars
and motorcyclists who travel more use helmets more than those who ride less often. See
generally Blomquist, Motorist Use of Safety Equipment: Expected Benefits or Risk Incom-
petence, 4 J. Risk & Uncertainty 135 (1991). Thus, casual claims that consumers are
uninterested in safety should be rejected.
23. Frequent users of a product tend to pay less attention to warnings and perceive
less danger associated with product hazards. This "familiarity effect" will not necessarily
strengthen the anchoring effect. A product improvement could restore salience to the
safety risk, causing consumers to pay attention. For a general discussion of these issues,
see deTurck & Goldhaber, Effectiveness of Product Warning Labels: Effects of Consum-
ers' Information Processing Objectives, 23 J. Consumer Aff. 111 (1989).
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(i) P,P: Consumers are pessimists respecting improvements and risk
levels. The former "improvement effect" error creates an insufficient in-
centive for firms to improve products; the latter "risk level effect" error
causes consumers to buy too few products (because they overestimate the
danger). Thus, consumer errors offset (to some extent).
(ii) C,P: Consumers correctly estimate the effect of safety improve-
ments but overestimate the risk level, so too few relatively safe products
are purchased.
(iii) P,C: Consumers underestimate the effect of safety improvements
but correctly estimate the risk level, so firms have an insufficient incen-
tive to produce safe products24 .
(iv) C,C: Consumer estimates are correct, so the level of safety is
optimal.
Only the first and fourth cells appear stable. If consumers are pessi-
mists respecting the current risk level, but correctly perceive the effect of
improvements, then over time consumer pessimism respecting the level
will vanish. Therefore, the C,P cell should approach the C,C cell.' If
consumers know the current risk level, but underestimate improvements
in it, then over time consumers will become pessimistic respecting the
level itself. To see why, realize that consumer pessimism respecting
safety improvements does not imply the absence of improvements. Firms
will make any improvement whose cost is below the consumers' (incor-
rectly low) willingness to pay. Suppose then that consumers accurately
believe the current probability of a defect to be 10%, a firm lowers the
probability to 7% but consumers think the probability has been reduced
only to 9%. Then consumers will have become pessimists respecting the
risk level; they have come to believe that the defect probability is higher
than it actually is. Hence, the P,C cell should collapse into the P,P cell.26
24. Certain situations that this cell describes have been analyzed, though in different
terms. Commentators claim that when consumers know the average risk level that a
product poses but not the risk level of a particular firm's product, firms have an insuffi-
cient incentive to produce safety. See, e.g., Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J.
Legal Stud. 1, 1 (1980). When firm X improves its product, consumers will average the
improvement over all products, including the unimproved ones. Consequently, consum-
ers may believe that the generic "product" has not been made materially safer. If so,
demand for firm X's product could increase by too little to justify incurring the cost of
the safety improvement. This actually is a concrete example of the third cell, where
consumers underestimate the effect of safety improvements. When a firm can distinguish
its improved version from the others, the CC cell describes reality: if consumers know
the average risk level as well as individual firm efforts to reduce risk, the market will
behave optimally.
25. Firms have an incentive to dispel pessimism respecting the risk level because it
dampens demand. To the extent that firms are successful, the process the text describes
will be accelerated.
26. This result should be qualified slightly. If (i) firms have made all improvements
whose cost is lower than the consumers' willingness to pay; (ii) the state of the art re-
specting safety does not improve; (iii) consumers come to learn the true risk level over
time; and (iv) consumers are pessimists in general respecting improvements, then the P,C
cell will be restored. That all of these conditions will be met at one time seems unlikely.
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The C,C cell is stable because it reflects a competitive equilibrium: firms
are producing the amount of safety that informed consumers want to
buy, and consequently no market actor has an incentive to alter her
behavior.
To summarize, unregulated markets either will produce the optimal
level of safety (the C,C cell), or they will not (the P,P cell). In the latter
circumstance, each product will be less safe than it should be but fewer
products will be bought than should be. Whether total accident costs are
too low or too high in general is unknowable a priori. The direct evi-
dence fails to distinguish between the relevant possibilities. If the P,P
cell describes the common case, no evidence exists to show whether the
improvement effect or the risk-level effect generally is the more impor-
tant-that is, whether total accident costs in the United States are too
high (because the improvement effect is stronger) or too low (because the
risk-level effect is stronger). This analysis does not provide a conclusive
case for rejecting the assumption that consumers misperceive risks. On
the other hand, A5 seems a weak foundation on which to rest the law of
strict products liability. What should be done?
III. THE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC RESPONSE
A. Analyzing the Case For Strict Liability
A strong majority believe that strict liability is desirable. These ana-
lysts assume that consumers make systematic errors respecting product
risks and that markets respond by underproducing safety. Strict liability
induces firms to make safer products. More safety is desirable for two
reasons. First, safety is efficient, both because price reflects cost more
accurately and because accidents create externalities. When a person has
a serious injury or dies, her family and others suffer; sometimes, she or
they must be rescued by the state. Producers do not take these costs into
account, and therefore overproduce dangerousness. Second, and in-
dependent of efficiency, compensation can be insufficient. Perhaps no
amount of money can adequately compensate a person for being horribly
burned over three fourths of his body. Hence, the state should reduce
the likelihood and severity of accidents. This latter reason has a neo-
Kantian flavor: the state would not adequately respect persons were it to
permit a state of affairs to exist-the unregulated market-that would
create an excessive number of awful (and hard-to-compensate) invasions
of personal integrity. Therefore, a strict liability regime is justifiable.
These arguments are problematic. First, whether consumers do sys-
tematically misperceive risks is unknown. Second, the view that con-
sumer misperceptions (if these exist) necessarily would induce
unregulated markets to produce too little safety is wrong. The aggregate
effect of misperceptions actually is indeterminate because the errors that
When they are, the market is statically efficient (price reflects cost) but dynamically ineffi-
cient (firms have an insufficient incentive to do safety research).
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consumers are most likely to make have offsetting safety effects. As a
consequence, particular markets would respond differently to consumer
mistakes. For example, suppose that consumers are pessimists respecting
both the risk-level and safety improvements, and that it is difficult to
make a particular product safer. Medical drugs may illustrate this case.
Then, that consumers would underestimate the effect of innovations that
make the product safer is relatively unimportant because firms could
make few such innovations. Rather, the consumer's belief that the prod-
uct is more dangerous than it actually is would dominate: consumers in
an unregulated market would buy too few products (and in the case of
drugs there would be too much unrelieved suffering). Thus, whether
there would be too few or too many accidents without strict liability
(were the P,P cell to describe many cases) is context-dependent. If there
would be too few, then strict liability would worsen the consumer's lot
because it would further dampen demand for beneficial products."
In short, there is substantial uncertainty respecting whether consumers
do misperceive risks and what the effect of likely misperceptions are.
Thus, the appropriate question is what legal regime the state should
adopt given uncertainty about the relevant facts. Strict liability advo-
cates do not ask this question because they assume that they know the
facts.
The case for strict liability is questionable on two other grounds. First,
the neoKantian argument for strict liability set out above is dramatic but
poorly developed. A respect for the autonomy of persons implies that
invasions of physical integrity are unjustified unless there is consent. It
was argued above that consumers prefer not to insure against nonpecu-
niary harm and would prefer to purchase insurance against pecuniary
harm on the market rather than from firms.2" These claims imply that a
consumer who purchased in an unregulated legal regime would have
consented to bear the risk of the harm she later incurred; she would have
the product she wanted under the contract she wanted. One may re-
spond that such a consumer is misinformed about risk. But then the
neoKantian case for strict liability turns on the accuracy and effect of the
assumption that consumers misperceive risks. As asked above, what
should the state do when substantial uncertainty about A5 exists?2 9
27. In the example above, the product (a drug) would yield costs in excess of benefits
in an unregulated regime, and the product could not be made very much safer. Strict
liability is particularly questionable in this case because of its demand-reducing effect.
Reducing the number of transactions that have positive expected utility makes consumers
worse off in the aggregate.
28. See supra Sec. II(A)
29. There also is no distributional case for strict liability, if a distributional case
means shifting wealth from richer to poorer people. Firms that are strictly liable raise
prices so consumers as a group are no better off. Consumers could only be better off were
strict liability efficient; then the firms' price increases would be below the cost of the risks
that consumers would otherwise bear. Were preferences for safety and insurance to vary
materially across consumers, however, strict liability would have a distributional impact.
Whether that impact would be consistent with prevailing distributional rationales seems
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The second ground on which to object to strict liability is that the
efficiency case for it is weak even if consumers are uninformed. Initially,
strict liability creates one information problem in the service of solving
another. The new problem is that firms are required to compensate all
consumer losses, but cannot estimate those losses, including nonpecu-
niary losses, with any degree of precision. As a consequence, strict liabil-
ity probably does not induce the optimal provision of safety. This claim
is strengthened when another implication of holding firms liable for non-
pecuniary losses is pursued. Product prices in today's legal regime incor-
porate premiums that reflect the expected value of full ex post
compensation, not the consumers' ex ante willingness to pay for safety or
his willingness to insure against harm. These prices thus are "incorrect"
from both safety and insurance viewpoints; they are higher than they
should be. The result is excessively to dampen demand for products that
could cause harm.30 Whatever underproduction of safety is caused in
consequence of consumer risk misperceptions is partly offset (or perhaps
fully overcome) by the effect of imposing liability for nonpecuniary harm
on firms.
3 1
To summarize, the case for letting the market regulate product safety
seems weak because consumers may be uninformed about product risks.
The case for letting courts regulate product safety-the case for the first
aspect of strict liability-also seems weak because consumers may be in-
difficult to know. For a further discussion, see Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal
Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 361
(1991).
30. This effect of strict liability for nonpecuniary losses is most clearly described in
Calfee & Rubin, supra note 15. See also Schwartz, supra note 9, at 408-11 (criticizing
strict liability for nonpecuniary harm and suggesting an alternative, imposing tort fines
on firms that produce unsafe products, to strict liability).
31. A recent argument against this conclusion is that consumers often purchase first-
party insurance policies that do not distinguish among types of harm-causing activities.
The consumer's insurance payments thus do not increase when she purchases dangerous
products. Consumers therefore would purchase too many such products were strict lia-
bility not to internalize accident costs. See Hanson & Logue, The First Party Insurance
Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 129,
146-54 (1990). The empirical significance of this risk-externalization effect is unclear. It
seems unimportant for products or consumer activities that could cause substantial losses
for three reasons: (a) Today, first-party insurers experience rate dangerous activities and
often terminate consumers who incur large losses, see Schwartz, The Ethics and Econom-
ics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 313, 320 (1990) ("there are major
elements of responsiveness [to risk] in many insurance arrangements"). In these cases,
consumers pay for increasing risk; (b) Insurance companies now often exercise their right
of subrogation to sue companies whose products cause large losses; when this right is
routinely exercised, product prices reflect expected accident costs; and (c) consumers can
reduce their exposure to risk and thus the amount of first party insurance they demand by
eschewing dangerous activities (a consumer who decides not to fly small planes has less
need for disability insurance). Thus, consumers who purchase dangerous items do incur
a loss, the additional insurance they must buy. This loss in effect reinserts accident costs
in product prices. Were the law to abandon strict liability, these three market. responses
would be accentuated. Therefore, the "first-party insurance externality" is a coherent,
but probably not a strong, argument in favor of strict liability.
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formed about product risks. Also, the effect of consumer misperceptions
is hard to assess. Scholars for decades have attempted to make a "first
order choice" between strict liability and the market. To make a first
order choice requires the resolution of uncertainty about the true state of
affairs. For example, a first order case for strict liability would establish
the existence and effect of imperfect information and then show why
strict liability is the appropriate public response. Debate has been incon-
clusive in considerable part because the true state of affairs has been very
hard to discover. Part III.B below attempts a second order approach. It
asks what legal regime is preferable given uncertainty about the true state
of affairs.
B. A Second Order Case for the Market
1. A Methodological Introduction
Political philosophy recently has attempted to develop a "neutral liber-
alism." The fundamental claim that this form of liberalism makes is that
society's basic institutional structure should be derived from values that
all citizens would reasonably hold or would find it unreasonable to re-
ject.3 2 The most important such values are said to be freedom, equality,
and tolerance. There is an unresolved tension in neutral liberalism. The
basic institutional structure could be neutral as among citizens just be-
cause every person happens to hold and rank highly the central values
from which the structure is derived. This way of putting the view is
troublesome because it makes the social fabric contingent on what people
now believe is just; the constitution should shift with the winds of intel-
lectual fashion. Also, few values are acceptable to everyone. A person
whose religious views justify a theocracy cannot be persuaded to support
religious tolerance on the ground that many people do; those people, he
will think, are misguided. Liberalism could avoid these difficulties by
claiming that people should hold the values of freedom, equality, and
tolerance because these values are objectively correct. Kantians and util-
itarians do so argue, but not everyone accepts these moral philosophies.
Thus, a liberalism that claimed that its central values were correct would
no longer be neutral as between every conception of the state's appropri-
ate structure that citizens may hold.33
Participants in this unresolved debate agree that the state's ordinary
business can be the product of shifting consensus and compromise. They
recognize the great difficulty of achieving unanimity on concrete issues of
32. The most prominent exponent of the first formulation of the view is Rawls. See
authorities cited supra note 3. The most prominent exponent of the second formulation is
Scanlon. See Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in Utilitarianism and Beyond
117 (1982).
33. This tension in liberal neutrality is clearly exposed in Neal, supra note 3, at 36-38.
See also Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, 19 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3,
15 (1990) (arguing that Rawls' consensus-based ideas must be expanded to include neu-
tral values of justice and truth).
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political choice because information is hard to get and because the
strength with which values are held influences the assessment of inevita-
bly inconclusive evidence. Unanimity is essential only for matters of fun-
damental importance, such as society's basic institutional structure.
Coercion against dissenters cannot be justified respecting this matter by
the need to get on with it.
There is a level of choice that is intermediate between the constitution
and the concrete legal rule. This level is illustrated by the choice consid-
ered here; that is, what legal regime should regulate a broad area such as
product safety? This choice should be made in as neutral a fashion as
possible, which is to say that it should be derived from the values that
today are most broadly held in our society. The gain from this procedure
is that the legal regime so chosen would engender the least dissent, and
so would be the most stable and the easiest to administer. It also is no
objection to this method that the choice of legal regime could shift with
shifts in intellectual fashion. In a democracy, current law is supposed to
reflect current values given the basic structure that is in place.
The method of neutral choice works by asking what legal regime a
representative person would prefer assuming her commitment to the cen-
tral values of freedom, equality, and tolerance. 34 To ensure neutrality,
the chooser cannot have an immediate stake in the outcome. This re-
quirement can be met in two ways: the choosing person is assumed not
to know how the legal regime could affect him because he could be any
(actual) one; or the choosing person should self-consciously consider the
issue from all affected points of view. These differences seem more se-
mantic than real. The policy analyst also should specify the (idealized)
choosing person's attitude toward risk (the person faces uncertainty be-
cause he does not know who he will be). When choosing legal regimes
within an ongoing polity rather than choosing the polity's basic institu-
tional structure, it would be erroneous to assume that the chooser is ex-
cessively risk averse. This is because advanced societies have in place
nontrivial social-safety nets.
2. The Argument
These methodological considerations imply that society's choice
whether the market or the judicial system should govern the area of
product defects should be considered from the viewpoint of a representa-
tive product purchaser. The commitment to freedom implies that con-
sumers' choices should determine the legal regime; the commitment to
34. This method of moral analysis is an example of the possibility of a liberalism that
does not require foundationalism; the source of the values from which conclusions are
inferred "lies in the group practices which generate the beliefs and provide the criteria of
their validity." Thigpen & Downing, Liberal and Communitarian Approaches to Justifi-
cation, The Rev. of Pol. 533, 545 (1989). An interesting criticism of this methodology is
Brudney, Hypothetical Consent and Moral Force, 10 L. & Phil. 235 (1991), but the author
appears to conflate consent to bear a risk with consent to bear a sunk cost.
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equality implies that the specified chooser's view should prevail if he is
relevantly like everyone else (for then his choice would not systematically
disadvantage any class of persons); and the commitment to tolerance
seems to provide no objection to letting the majority rule on the level of
political choice now at issue. The policy question is whether such a rep-
resentative consumer would prefer contracts or courts. A representative
consumer knows: (a) that he will make many purchases over the course
of his life, but not which ones; (b) that he may be rich, middle-class, or
poor; (c) that he is "ordinarily" risk averse given his income level, 5 and
(d) that he is as uncertain about the existence and extent of consumer
risk misperceptions as the analysis above shows he should be.
Such a person would choose the market because the market would
make him substantially better off than would a regime of strict liability.
A thought experiment shows why. Let the consumer be asked to choose
among the legal regimes that are precisely described below. She knows,
respecting consumer risk perceptions, that either the P,P cell or the C,C
cell describes reality (always or sometimes). She also knows that her
purchase choices will not affect the total level of safety that obtains; sin-
gle individuals cannot influence market outcomes. The legal regimes are:
1. Free contracting: The default rule requires firms to repair or replace
defective products for a reasonable time after purchase and to compen-
sate consumers for incidental damages, but not for consequential dam-
ages (medical expenses, lost income, pain, and suffering).36 Under this
default contract, the consumer can insure against product accidents and
purchase safety improvements as she prefers.
2. Strict liability: The consumer must buy pecuniary and nonpecu-
niary loss coverage from manufacturers.
A consumer who knows how to make decisions but who does not
know whether the P,P or C,C cell describes reality would assume that
each has an equal probability of being true." Consequently, the con-
sumer's preference over legal regimes is a function only of the payoffs.
Suppose first that the P,P cell is true generally. In the first regime, prod-
ucts are inefficiently unsafe (they are improved less than fully informed
consumers would prefer). The idealized choosing consumer knows that
an actual consumer could mitigate this undesirable effect in two ways.
First, when economies of scale to safety are absent-the firm can alter
the safety of products as small sets of consumers desire-then the actual
consumer could purchase as much safety as she prefers. For example,
the consumer could purchase a car with an air bag or without, with anti-
35. This assumption is made to rule out risk aversion so extreme as to justify con-
sumer choice according to the maximin criterion. This criterion tells the chooser to max-
imize her payoff in the worst possible state of the world, no matter how unlikely that state
is to arise. See D.C. Mueller, Public Choice II 412-14 (1989).
36. The illustrative default rule approximates the contract respecting defect risks that
informed parties use today. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
37. In decision theory, this method is known as the law of least reason.
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lock brakes or without. When economies of scale to safety exist-the
product must be made safer for many consumers or for none-the con-
sumer could buy market insurance and also purchase a warranty or a
service contract.38 Second, the idealized consumer would be an actual
pessimistic consumer, who would purchase fewer dangerous products
than he would actually like.
In the strict-liability regime (again assuming the P,P cell best describes
reality), when economies of scale to safety exist, strict liability can make
products safer. This desirable effect is offset by undesirable effects. First,
when the risk-level effect is the more important, demand is already too
low. Strict liability may further dampen demand to the point where de-
sirable products become expensive, 39 scarce, or nonexistent. Second,
strict liability requires the consumer to purchase insurance from the
seller against pecuniary and nonpecuniary harm. Consumers generally
prefer market insurance and only against pecuniary losses. ° Finally, the
demand-dampening effect of strict liability is exacerbated by holding
firms liable for nonpecuniary harm, because the consequent price in-
creases can be very high.41
In sum, were the P,P cell to be generally true, it is difficult to know
whether a regime of free contracting would make actual consumers mate-
rially worse off relative to a strict liability regime, given the steps that
actual consumers could take to protect themselves (including purchasing
fewer products) and given how strict liability affects market performance.
Suppose next that the C,C cell is true generally. Then actual consum-
ers have positive expected utility in the free-contracting regime. Prod-
ucts are optimally safe and the consumer can insure as she pleases.
Consumers have much lower expected utility in the strict-liability re-
gime. Strict liability forces consumers to purchase insurance they do not
want and product safety they do not want, raises prices, and sometimes
causes products that generate positive benefits on net not to be sold.
The ideal choosing consumer would prefer the free-contracting regime
38. The effect of economies of scale to safety on consumer preferences for contracts is
explored in Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An
Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 Yale L.J. 369, 398-401 (1990).
39. When demand falls, firms are less able to exploit economies of scale in produc-
tion, and prices may rise in consequence.
40. The forced-insurance effect of strict liability is significant. Viscusi's study showed
that:
For claims in which there is a positive pain and suffering award, the average
share of pain and suffering compensation is about two-thirds .... [Thus] the
contribution of pain and suffering is remarkably high. Noneconomic damages
are not a minor after thought but are the driving force of compensation levels in
situations in which the pain and suffering amounts are positive.
Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Products Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or Ca-
pricious Awards?, 8 Int. Rev. Law & Econ. 203, 208 (1988). Because the expected cost of
these awards is reflected in product prices, consumers must pay for considerable insur-
ance that they do not want.
41. Calfee & Rubin, supra note 15, show this in theory; for data see Viscusi, supra
note 40.
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because it generates a considerably higher payoff. If the C,C cell de-
scribes reality, free contracting yields the consumer the highest possible
payoff while strict liability yields the lowest; if the P,P cell describes real-
ity, free contracting yields the consumer a payoff that exceeds the mini-
mum while strict liability will not raise that payoff materially. Thus, free
contracting will generate greater expected utility for actual consumers
unless the probability that the P,P cell is true exceeds 50% by a consider-
able margin. Because a consumer choosing legal regimes will assign an
equal probability to the C,C and P,P outcomes, she will prefer freedom of
contract.42
The issue, recall, is not whether the consumer would prefer an exten-
sive or narrow warranty, or which of these would be efficient or distribu-
tionally superior. Rather, the issue is which legal regime the consumer
would prefer given that the consumer is uncertain about how aggregate
consumer choices influence market outcomes. For the reasons given, the
representative consumer would prefer a legal regime that permits free
contracting. In this regime, consumers would pay firms to make cost-
justified safety improvements, and would insure against pecuniary
"residual risks" (those not worth avoiding) on the market, not in the
product-sales contract. Put in the language above, the best second order
moral case is for a market regime of this sort rather than for a strict-
liability regime.
The set of legal regimes available to society is not limited to strict lia-
bility or to an unregulated market. The state also could provide a legal
regime 3, in which free contracting is permitted only if firms make partic-
ular disclosures. The idealized choosing consumer would prefer regime 3
to the free-contracting regime." The consumer would make this deci-
sion because the provision of warnings and instructions increases the
probability that consumers will estimate and respond to risks correctly;
that is, disclosure increases the probability that the C,C cell is true. Be-
cause the consumer prefers a legal regime that permits free contracting
when she assigns a 50% probability to the CC cell, she would value
more highly a regime that increased that probability above 50%. There-
42. An expected utility calculation may clarify the argument in text. To capture the
relative ranking among the payoffs described above, suppose that in the free-contracting
regime the consumer gains twelve units if the CC cell is true and nine units if the PP cell
is true; in the strict-liability regime, the consumer gains eight units if the CC cell is true
and ten units if the P,P cell is true. The idealized choosing consumer's expected gain
from the free-contracting (G') and strict-liability (G) regimes, summed over the n trans-
actions she will make in her life, is
G'=uX7[p(12) + (1-p) (9)]
G'=u1'[P(8) + (l-p) (10)]
Equation G' exceeds equation G2 until p falls to approximately .2. The representative
consumer, who is not highly risk averse, thus prefers the free-contracting regime when
she supposes p to be .5.
43. Letting [p] represent "preferred to," the claim is that the idealized choosing con-
sumer's preferences over legal regimes are: regime 3 [p] regime 1 [p] regime 2.
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fore, the representative consumer would rank regime 3 first. The "neu-
trality method" for choosing legal regimes according to the preferences
of an ideally situated consumer thus best supports the conclusion that the
state should permit free contracting supplemented by disclosure."
C. Summary
The state can respond to the product-defect problem primarily
through its courts or through the market. It has chosen the courts on the
basis of six fundamental assumptions. Four of these assumptions seem
incorrect and another seems overdrawn. The truth of the last, that con-
sumer risk misperceptions cause unregulated markets to perform poorly,
is unsettled. Conventional utilitarian and autonomy-based moral no-
tions, as instantiated in the choosing method just described, imply the
repeal of strict products liability on this record. Rather, the state should
rely on the market supplemented by an appropriate disclosure law.45 The
question is how best to do this.
IV. CONCLUSION: A NATIONAL WARNING SYSTEM
The foregoing discussion shows that the most normatively defensible
legal regime for products is free contract with regulated disclosure. As a
consequence, two public policy tasks should be undertaken. The first is
to replace strict products liability with a default rule that resembles the
contract that informed parties would choose. The second task is to de-
velop a sensible system of warnings and safety instructions. The national
government should play a substantial role in the latter effort. A brief
discussion of warnings will show why.
A product can malfunction in several ways that cause different degrees
of harm. For example, eye glasses can merely break or shatter; the possi-
ble harm from the former is trivial relative to the possible harm from the
latter. Thus, a warning system should rank possible product defects ac-
44. When consumers have roughly similar preferences for insurance arid safety, dis-
tributional and efficiency questions are coextensive: consumers can benefit distribution-
ally only from efficient rules. Therefore, assuming that the representative consumer
wants to maximize utility cannot generate outcomes that violate common distributional
preferences. When consumers have heterogeneous preferences, efficiency and distribu-
tional analyses may diverge: in some cases, an efficient risk allocation may worsen the lot
of more consumers than it improves; in other cases, an inefficient allocation may have the
opposite effect. It seems difficult to know when either outcome will actually happen, or
whether any such outcome will be good or bad as assessed by accepted distributional
rationales. Also, the effect of consumer heterogeneity on the choice of the legal regime
itself seems an unexplored topic. For these reasons, distributional consequences of the
heterogeneity effect are ignored here. Issues respecting the effect of heterogeneity at the
level of choice of legal rule are thoughtfully discussed in Craswell, supra note 29.
45. If strict liability were replaced by a market regime, there would be no "tort" basis
for punitive damage awards. Under the proposed regime, firms could be liable for breach
of contract or for failing to make appropriate disclosure. There would seldom be a good
ground for awarding punitive damages in connection with either wrong. See Schwartz,
supra note 38, at 369.
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cording to the degree of danger they create, and then match warnings to
the degree of danger. Also because labels have little space, and because
consumers observe only the product label, it is possible to give no more
than a limited set of warnings for many products. When few warnings
can be given, they should relate to major risks. In such cases, firms
should not warn against slight risks at all. Further, there is a social sci-
ence of risk communication; warnings should reflect the findings in this
literature.4
Such a warning system cannot emerge (and has not emerged) from
common-law products liability litigation. Initially, juries see only cases
where a consumer is injured in consequence of a malfunction against
which the firm failed to warn or is claimed to have warned inadequately.
The jury never is told of other possible malfunctions or asked to rank
these by degree of danger. Rather, the jury is asked to assess the firm's
performance with respect to the malfunction that actually happened.
Thus, the jury cannot know whether a firm's failure to warn was correct
in light of other risks that the product posed, or whether a warning that
appears too pallid ex post actually was correct because other risks were
more serious. This institutional system, therefore, creates poor incen-
tives for firms. They may respond by warning against malfunctions that
have been involved in litigation because not to do so invites punitive
damage claims, although these may pose the less-serious risks. Alterna-
tively, firms may try to warn against everything. Either response reduces
the efficacy of warnings against major risks: in the former case, such
warnings may not be given; in the latter, these warnings may be lost in
the clutter. In addition, firms have an insufficient incentive to craft
warnings with the aid of warning specialists because juries lack expertise
and are supposed to evaluate warnings de novo; under this legal regime, a
well-crafted and an "amateur" warning probably have close to an equal
chance of being upheld.
These deficiencies of a jury-run disclosure system exist when each
product is considered in isolation; other deficiencies appear when prod-
ucts are considered globally. To see why, suppose that two products
each malfunction with probability .001. When one product malfunc-
tions, consumers experience nausea and sometimes vomiting; when the
other malfunctions, consumers are blinded. A warning that discloses
only the odds of malfunction for these two products is inadequate. Simi-
larly, labels on each product that contained similar warning symbols or
just recited "DANGER" would be inadequate. Instead, risks should be
ranked across products as well as among single products, and warnings
should be appropriate given a product's "global" ranking. Common-law
litigation cannot create such a system.
The need for an administrative presence is obvious. This presence
46. These and the points in the following paragraphs draw on Chapters Two and
Three, Volume 2, of the ALI Report, cited supra note 11.
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should be federal. No agency, federal or state, can regulate many prod-
ucts. Rather, the need is for a warning vocabulary that all firms can use.
As an analogy, the Truth in Lending Law does not require the Federal
Reserve Board to regulate the disclosures of individual lenders but rather
creates a common disclosure format-the annual percentage rate-for
disclosure of credit price information. Here, the need is for warning
symbols or words that describe risk levels: the word "danger" should
apply to a particular level of risk that any product may pose, and to no
other level of risk. A firm's warning should be upheld when it uses the
word "danger" appropriately. Only a national agency can create such a
warning vocabulary.47 Therefore, society should rely primarily on the
market supplemented with a nationally run disclosure scheme to regulate
product safety.
47. The suggestion that the Federal Government should create a warning vocabulary
first appears in ALI Chapter 2, cited supra note 11. For a somewhat similar suggestion
that a "scoring system" should be developed that would permit consumers to rank the
products of different firms when these products have similar attributes, see Beales, Cras-
well & Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J. Law & Econ. 491,
523-27 (1981).
[Vol. 60
